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Refining the Antitrust Immunity of Railroad
Ratemaking: The Railroad Revitalization and
Regulatory Reform Act of 1976.
On February 5, 1976 President Ford signed into law the Railroad
Revitalization and Reform Act of 1976,' a $6.4 billion program designed to "help restore the health and vitality of our nation's private
railroad system." 2 A key element of this ambitious program, embodied in the rate reform provisions of the Act 3 is the implementation
of a policy favoring the substitution of competitive forces for regulatory controls. As a means of effectuating this controversial policy,,
the Revitalization Act, by amending section 5a of the Interstate
Commerce Act,5 narrows the existing statutory exemption provided
railroad ratemaking by federal antitrust law.' Consequently, the
new amendments require a change in traditional railroad ratemaking practices.
The Department of Transportation, which sponsored the legislation, maintains that the amendments will eliminate predatory pricing and that, "far from causing the collapse of a carefully ordered
structure, they will open the way to healthy competition and costbased rates." 7 Critics contend that the amendments unnecessarily
1. Pub. L. No. 94-210, §§ 101 et seq. (Feb. 5, 1976) [hereinafter cited as the Revitalization
Act].
2. Comments of President Ford at the signing of the bill. Stephen Ailes, President of the
Association of American Railroads, called the bill "the most comprehensive railroad legislation enacted in this century." TRAFFIC WORLD, Feb. 9, 1976, at 11, col. 1.
3. Pub. L. No. 94-210, §§ 201-212 (Feb. 5, 1976).
4. For a discussion of this policy and the reasons favoring its implementation see Snow,
Exploding Myths about Transportation Regulatory Reform, 42 ICC PRAC. J. 731 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Snow]. Mr. Snow is Deputy Under Secretary of Transportation, Washington, D.C.
5. 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970). Prior to the Revitalization Act amendments, this section applied
to common carriers by rail, common carriers by motor vehicle and freight forwarders. The
Revitalization Act, however, removes rail carriers from the application of section 5a of the
Interstate Commerce Act and inserts a new section 5b which is applicable solely to common
carriers by railroad.
6. Since 1948, when Congress overrode President Truman's veto to enact section 5a,
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) approved rate bureaus, organizations of carriers
which provide forums and procedures for the joint determination of rate matters have enjoyed
an express statutory exemption from the operation of the antitrust laws. See S. REP. No. 499,
94th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, 15 (1976). This article is concerned only with the antitrust immunity
of railroad rate bureaus.
7. Snow, supra note 4, at 739. He also stated:
What we seek is increased reliance on the self-regulating effects of competitive
market forces. Our goal is a safe, efficient, and reliable national transportation
system which will best serve the needs of the consuming public through a wide

Loyola University Law Journal

[Vol. 7

inhibit the conference method of ratemaking which they consider
essential to the realistic nondiscriminatory determination of railroad rates and to the continued availability of national rail transportation services.'
This article will focus on the relevant provisions of the 1976
amendments to section 5a and their effect on the antitrust exposure
of the railroad pricing structure.
THE FUNCTION OF THE RAILROAD RATE BUREAUS

Railroad rate bureaus are unincorporated associations of individual rail carriers that are organized generally on a regional basis.
Their primary function is to serve as a forum for the collective
determination of rate matters and to act as an agency publishing
tariffs for participating member carriers.' They also serve as important informational sources-gathering and disseminating traffic
and transportation information. 0 According to an industry spokesman, the bureaus constitute the core element in the railroads' ratemaking process and shipper participation in that process:
Through bureau procedures, shippers are notified by mail when
a proposal is filed; shippers and carriers have an opportunity to
develop complete information as to the effects of the proposal; and
compromises can be worked out through collective action which
avoid disruption of market relationships sensitive to transportation costs, avoid changes in rates which prefer one shipper or community over another, and avoid needless litigation before the Commission. These procedures bring the collective judgment of shippers and carriers to bear on the difficult question of what rate level
will enable the carrier to maintain the service and at the same time
variety of competitive services with dependable, prompt delivery and cost-based
rates. We want to encourage greater price competition and service flexibility, ease,
not abolish, entry restrictions for motor carriers, reduce anticompetitive practices,
and encourage the most efficient use of transportation resources.
Id. at 735.
8. Critics of the changes include the ICC, the carriers and some shippers. See, e.g.,
statement of Stephen Ailes, President, Association of American Railroads; statement of
George M. Stafford, Chairman, ICC; and statement of John E. Gross, Chairman, Traffic
Committee, American Iron and Steel Institute, Hearings on H.R. 12891, H.R. 5385, H.R.
13487, H.R. 10694 and S. 1149 Before the Subcomm. on Transportationand Aeronautics of
the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
Prior to the enactment of the Revitalization Act amendments, in Ex Parte No. 297, Rate
Bureau Investigation, 349 I.C.C. 811 (1975), the ICC disapproved the curtailment of antitrust
immunity as a means of effectuating the goals of the national transportation policy and
effective regulation. See text accompanying note 89 infra.
9. Ex ParteNo. 297, Rate Bureau Investigation, 349 I.C.C. 811, 822 (1975).
10. Id. Railroad rate bureaus have existed in one form or another for over 100 years. The
first was the Southern Freight Association founded in approximately 1875.
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be low enough to induce movement of the commodity in question.
Thus, bureau procedure and action makes it possible to consider
the consequences of a prospective rate change in light of the best
information as furnished by the affected shippers and other railroads.II
THE NECESSITY OF JOINT ACTION IN RAILROAD RATEMAKING

Any analysis of the application of the antitrust laws to the railroad rate bureaus must begin with the threshold consideration of
two principal factors involved in railroad ratemaking that mandate
a certain amount of joint action on rates by competing carriers: first,
the integrated nature of the national rail transportation system; and
second, the legal requirements and standards imposed on rail carriers by the Interstate Commerce Act and the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC). These factors combine to make competition
among the railroads essentially different from competition in other
enterprises.
The integrated nature of the national rail system provides the
railroad industry with one of its most fundamental and unique features-individual railroad companies are at the same time both
competitors and partners in providing transportation services. 12 A
simple example illustrates this feature: two individual connecting
railroads may combine to form a joint line (through) route between
two geographic points. Their relationship as partners necessitates
agreement between them on the applicable rate to be applied to this
joint line route and on the division of the revenue generated by
traffic moving over it. As bona fide partners, they may jointly determine the joint rate without incurring antitrust liability. However, a
problem arises in the relatively common situation in which one or
both of the carriers has its own single line route between the same
two points which competes with the joint line route. Consequently,
the same carrier that determines what its own single line rate will
be, will also participate in the determination of the rate for the
competing joint line route in which it is a partner. In reality, this
situation is often multiplied since there may be several joint line
routes between two points, involving many different carriers, any
11. Statement of Stephen Ailes, President, Association of American Railroads, Hearings
on H.R. 12891, H.R. 5385, H.R. 13487, H.R. 10694 and S. 1149 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportationand Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 429 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Statement of Stephen Ailes.
12. Comments of the Association of American Railroads on Proposals Relating to Rate
Bureaus Contained in Subcommittee Working Draft No. 1., at 2 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Comments of the Association of American Railroads. Copy on file at Loyola University of
Chicago Law Journal office.
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number of which may have competing single line routes. A rate
bureau spokesman has noted:
Because of the interrelated nature of railroad operations, one
railroad often needs the cooperation of another railroad, which is
a strong competitor, in order to give its customers good service over
through routes and at a reasonable joint rate. There are few, if any,
competing enterprises3 in this country that are so interdependent
for financial success.
The second factor which mandates collective ratemaking by competing carriers is the existing legal framework in which they operate.
Provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act require in certain situations that an individual carrier's single line rate relate to the rates
of other railroads, whether the corresponding rates are for single or
joint line movements. For example, under section 3 of the Interstate
Commerce Act, 4 an individual carrier can be subjected to an ICC
order to eliminate undue preference and prejudice should it participate in rates that unduly prefer point A and unduly prejudice point
B, where both points ship competitive products to a common destination. The carrier may maintain a single line route from point A but
serve point B only by participation in a joint line route with connecting railroads which are also competitors. Compliance with such
a Commission order necessitates joint consideration and agreement
on both joint line and single line rates to abate the unlawful preference and prejudice. 5
This interrelationship of rates and the necessity for joint action
is illustrated by Washington Potatoand Onion Shippers Association
v. Union Pacific R. R.'" In that case the ICC found that single line
and joint line rates on potatoes from points in Washington to points
east of the Rocky Mountains, were up to 38 cents higher than the
corresponding rates on potatoes from southern Idaho and eastern
Oregon to the same destinations. To the extent that the Washington
rates were higher by more than 7-11 cents than the Oregon-Idaho
rates, this rate structure violated section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act by unduly prejudicing shippers in Washington and unduly preferring shippers in Idaho and Oregon. The Commission ordered the imbalance corrected. 7 In referring to the facts of the
13.
at 25,
14.
15.
16.
17.

Verified Statement of James M. Souby, Before the Interstate Commerce Commission
Ex Parte No. 297, Rate Bureau Investigation, 349 I.C.C. 811 (1975).
49 U.S.C. § 3 (1970).
Comments of the Association of American Railroads, supra note 12, at 6.
300 I.C.C. 537 (1957).
id. at 544-55.
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Washington Potato case eighteen years later, the Commission, in Ex
Parte No. 297, noted:
Joint action of the involved railroads accomplished the required
adjustments. This would not have been possible without consideration of single-line as well as joint-line rates.'"
This interrelationship of single line rates with joint line rates is
further recognized in the "aggregate of the intermediates" clause of
section 4(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act, which in pertinent part
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject to this chapter . . . to charge any greater compensation as a through rate than
the aggregate of the intermediate rates subject to the provisions of
this chapter .... 10
This provision makes every rate for a single line movement over an
individual railroad potentially part of a rate for a joint line movement should it ever, in combination with the local (single line) rate
of a connecting and competing railroad, result in a charge which is
lower than the applicable through (joint line) rate."° Thus, under
section 4 as under section 3, collective determination of rates by
competing carriers is necessary to avoid violating the Act.
Restrictions attached by the ICC in merger approvals also frequently necessitate joint action on both single line and joint line
rates by competing carriers. The Commission, for example, required
the Burlington Northern to "maintain and keep open all routes and
channels of trade via existing junctions and gateways" and to open
new gateways benefiting the Milwaukee Road and other competing
railroads."' Rates via these gateways are required to be maintained
at levels competitive with rates for Burlington Northern single line
routes. These conditions compel Burlington Northern to agree with
its competitors on changes in the level of rates applicable to its
single line routes in order to keep the joint line routings competitive
as required by the Commission. Similar conditions have been attached to the mergers of other railroads.2
This "necessity" for joint action by competitors in the railroad
ratemaking system has been recognized by the ICC, Congress and
the courts. In Ex Parte No. 297, the ICC noted that there exists
18. 349 I.C.C. 811, 848-49 (1975).
19. 49 U.S.C. § 4(1) (1970).
20.
21.

Comments of the Association of American Railroads, supra note 12, at 10.
Great Northern Pacific & Burlington Lines, Inc.-Merger, etc., 331 I.C.C. 228, 352

(1967).
22.

Comments of the Association of American Railroads, supra note 12, at 7-8.
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a symbiotic relationship between single-line and joint-line rates
which must be considered in order to maintain competitive equality for carriers as well as shippers, remove distortions in port relationships, effect compliance with statutory restraints against discrimination and preferences, and simply observe the 23realities of
diverse rates in a coordinated transportation network.
Congress was aware of the necessity for collective action embodied in the regulatory scheme when it enacted section 5a in 1948:
It is recognized by all who are familiar with the problems of
transportation that the carriers subject to the Interstate Commerce Act cannot satisfactorily meet their duties and responsibilities thereunder, and the basic purposes of that act cannot be effecpermitted to engage in
tively carried out, unless such carriers2 are
4
joint activities to a substantial extent.
Federal courts have recognized this fact. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania
Railroad,25 decided before the statutory antitrust exemption in section 5a was enacted, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence
of a "legitimate area of collaboration ' 26 in the making of railroad
rates. In a more recent antitrust case, Riss & Co. v. Association of
27
the district court in discussing the antitrust
American Railroads,
immunity provided by section 5a observed:
The railroads are right in their contention that cooperative or
joint rate-making is often essential, especially when the goods in
question are normally handled by many companies on a vast, interlocking rail system.'
Thus, the need in certain circumstances for the collective determination of rates by competing carriers has been recognized as a consequence of the integrated nature of the national rail system and the
regulatory scheme embodied in the Interstate Commerce Act. This
inherent feature of railroad ratemaking cannot be ignored in any
realistic application of the antitrust laws to the railroad pricing
structure.
23.
24.
25.

349 I.C.C. 811, 849 (1975).
2 U.S. CODE CONG. SERV. 1847 (1948).
324 U.S. 439 (1945). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes 47 through

49 infra.
26. Id. at 460.
27. 170 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1959). For further discussion, see text accompanying notes
56 through 58 infra.
28. Id. at 365-66.
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THE EVOLUTION OF RATE BUREAU ANTITRUST IMMUNITY

The clash between the collective ratemaking features of the railroad rate bureaus and the pro-competitive policies of the federal
antitrust laws is as old as the Sherman Act29 itself. The current
conflict, rekindled by passage of the 1976 amendments to section 5a,
is another in a long series of various attempts at reconciliation.
The controversy began in 1889, when a group of western railroads
formed the Trans-Missouri Freight Association ". . . for the purpose of mutual protection by establishing and maintaining reasonable rates, rules and regulations on all freight traffic both through
and local . . . ."I Under the provisions of the agreement, rates were
established by a committee, and any member which agreed with a
shipper to reduce the rates or change the regulations adopted by the
Association was subjected to a penalty.' In 1892, the Justice Department filed an antitrust suit against the Association under the
recently enacted Sherman Act, charging that the railroads' agreement was a contract in restraint of trade. The railroads defended on
the basis that they were under the exclusive jurisdiction of the ICC
(created in 1887 under the Interstate Commerce Act) and that the
rates so established were reasonable. Finally, the Supreme Court,
in United States v. Trans-Missouri FreightAssociation," held that
the railroads were subject to the Sherman Act and that all contracts
in restraint of trade were illegal under the Act without regard to any
33
standard of reasonableness.
The following year the Court heard an antitrust challenge to the
Joint Traffic Association which had been formed in 1896 by rail3
roads operating between Chicago and the eastern seaboard4.
Under
this agreement, unlike the one in Trans-Missouri,each individual
railroad reserved the right to change the rates applicable over its
own lines. This injection of an early version of the right of independent action"5 into the agreement did not persuade the Court which,
following its decision in Trans-Missouri,declared the combination
29. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). The Sherman Act was enacted in 1890. An antitrust suit
under the Sherman Act was filed against the Trans-Missouri Freight Association in 1892.
This discussion is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of the history of rate associations, but is merely designed to be an outline of the steps leading up to the 1976 amendments
to section 5a. For a more complete discussion of the pre-1948 period see Berge, The Rate
Making Process, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 449 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Bergel.
30. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n., 166 U.S. 290, 292 (1897).
31. Id. at 296.
32. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
33. Id. at 341.
34. United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
35. See text accompanying note 68 infra.
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unlawful and perpetually enjoined the operation of the Association .36
Nevertheless, organizations composed of railroads and their representatives did not disappear. The railroads, convinced of the necessity for joint ratemaking,3 7 believed that the association condemned in Trans-Missouri had too much power and that the freedom of action of the individual carriers was not sufficiently safeguarded. Accordingly, they sought to form rate bureaus which
would conform to the views expressed by the Court.3" Thus, "rate
bureaus" continued to function. 9 In addition, organizations in the
nature of trade associations were formed to carry out joint activities.'" Although the legality of these associations was questionable
in light of the earlier Supreme Court precedents, for the next forty
years no further antitrust prosecutions were made.4 Perhaps encouraged by this lack of prosecution, during the 1930's the railroads
engaged in more determined efforts to accomplish the joint consideration of rates.2 This time, however, the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice, greatly expanded in size by the end of the
36. 171 U.S. at 577-78.
37. The railroads were convinced that such bureaus were necessary and in fact indispensable for compliance with the Interstate Commerce Act, particularly with respect to through
routes and joint rates. To them, numerous amendments and additions to that Act since the
turn of the century indicated that Congress had "not intended that ordinary commercial
competition shall operate freely in the making of railroad rates." Dickinson, Rate Conferences
in the RailroadIndustry Under the Sherman Act to Regulate Commerce, 12 LAw & CONTEMP.
PxoB. 470, 483 (1947).
38. The bureaus attempted to protect themselves by providing for shipper consultation
on rates and by guaranteeing freedom of rate submission by individual carriers. Hilton,
Experience Under the Reed-Bulwinkle Act, 28 ICC PAC. J. 1207, 1208 (1961) [hereinafter
cited as Hilton].
39. For example, the Trans-Continental Freight Bureau was organized in 1897, the same
year in which the Trans-Missouri Freight Association was held illegal. The Bureau served as
a clearing house for information on proposed changes in tariffs, published tariffs and their
interpretation and provided weighing and inspection services. It was investigated by the ICC
pursuant to a Senate resolution passed in 1921. In 1923, the Commission found that the
maintenance and operation of the Bureau did not violate any provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act. In re Transcontinental Freight Bureau, 77 I.C.C. 252 (1923).
40. Berge, supra note 29, at 451-52 thoroughly describes the association employed.
41. One commentator noted:
Whether the forbearance of the Department represented an acquiescence to these
modifications or a recognition of the unworkability of the doctrine of the 1897-98
cases, one cannot say.
Hilton, supra note 38, at 1208.
42. In 1932, the western railroads entered the Commissioner Plan, Western District, under
the Western Agreement for joint consultation on rates and policies. The railroads in 1934
formed the Association of American Railroads which had supervisory and appellate powers
over rate bureaus. See Hilton, supra note 38, at 1208.
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decade,43 responded to the extension of rate bureau activity with a
renewal of prosecutions.44
While these suits were pending, the railroads briefly enjoyed an
express exemption from the antitrust laws for joint action on rates
as a result of the entry of the United States into World War II. At
the urgent request of the Office of Defense Transportation, the ICC,
and the War Department, Certificate No. 4445 was issued by the War
Production Board to remedy the confused situation concerning the
antitrust liability of the railroad rate bureaus. Basically, Certificate
No. 44 approved joint action by common carriers through rate bureaus in the initiation and establishment of rates, fares and charges
and certified that such action was considered necessary to the war
effort. It was revised somewhat after considering the objections of
the Antitrust Division of the Justice Department.4"
The fact that Certificate No. 44 was only a temporary wartime
solution was underscored in 1945 by the Supreme Court in Georgia
4 7 a decision which
v. Pennsylvania Railroad,
cast considerable
doubt on the future of railroad conference ratemaking. In that case,
the State of Georgia initiated a sweeping antitrust challenge to the
railroad rate bureaus. The State charged, among other things: that
some 60 rate bureaus, committees, conferences, associations and
other private rate-fixing agencies had been utilized by 20 defendant
railroads to fix their rates; that no railroad could change joint
through rates without approval of these private agencies; that bureau rate-fixing, which was not sanctioned by the Interstate Commerce Act and prohibited by the antitrust laws, had put the effec43. In the foreword to a symposium published in 1940 on the Sherman Act the editor
observed:
During the past two years, the fifty-year-old Sherman Act has achieved a vitality
unprecedented in its existence. Its invigoration is due to no amendment of its terms
nor to sudden change in the economy in which it operates. What has happened is
that the personnel of the agency charged with the Act's enforcement, the Antitrust
Division of the United States Department of Justice, has been increased to approximately eight times the size which it had averaged during the preceding fifteen years
and the range of its activities has been extended in like proportion.
7 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1, 1 (1940).

44. In 1941 the Division prosecuted motor carrier rate bureaus in Denver. In 1944 it
brought suit against operation of the Western Agreement in Lincoln, Nebraska. Simultaneously, the State of Georgia filed suit against several railroads and rate bureaus charging an
illegal conspiracy to maintain discriminatory freight rates. For further discussion of the State
of Georgia suit, see text accompanying notes 47 through 49 infra.
45. Certificate No. 44 was issued under section 17 of the Small Business Concerns Act of
1942, 56 Stat. 351, ch. 404 (1942). It was allowed to expire with other wartime emergency
regulations on October 1, 1946.
46. Berge, supra note 29, at 455.
47. 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
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tive control of rates to and from Georgia in the hands of the defendants. The State alleged that, as a result, such rates (to and from
Georgia) were 39 percent higher than rates for like commodities and
distances between points in the North; and that northern railroads
dominated and coerced southern railroads in the publication of joint
through rates." Although the decision was precipitated by a preliminary motion of the State, the Supreme Court seized the opportunity
and proceeded to state, in dictum, that railroad rate-fixing combinations were not immune from the operations of the antitrust laws,
and that none of the powers acquired by the ICC since the enactment of the Sherman Act related to the regulation of rate-fixing
combinations.4"
The language of the Court in the Georgia case caused grave concern among all those having a direct interest in transportation who
saw in the situation "a threat to long-standing practices in the
transportation industry that were developed in cooperation with the
shippers and have proved their worth."' 0 Efforts to procure a legislative resolution of the uncertainty were intensified. Finally, Congress, amid much controversy and after considerable debate, passed
the Carriers Rate Bureau Act of 1948,1' incorporating section 5a into
the Interstate Commerce Act. President Truman vetoed it"2 but
Congress overrode his veto.
Basically, section 5a authorized the railroads to apply to the Commission for approval of agreements "relating to rates, fares, classifications, divisions, allowances or charges . . . or rules and regulations pertaining thereto, or procedures for the joint consideration,
initiation or establishment thereof. . . .,3 Section 5a(9) contained
the sought after antitrust exemption:
48. Id. at 443-44.
49. Id. at 457.
50. H.R. Rep. No. 1100, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1947). The decision of the Supreme Court
in United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940), added to the concern. In
that case the Court held that price fixing by competitors was per se illegal.
51. 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970), also known as the Reed-Bulwinkle Act.
52. His unsuccessful veto message concluded:
Our present transportation policy contemplates a pattern of partial regulations,
within the frame work of which the pressures of competition will remain substantially effective. Regulations cannot entirely replace these competitive pressures. It
can guard against some of the potential abuses of monopoly power, but it cannot
be an effective substitute for the affirmative stimulus toward improved service and
lower rates which competition provides. By sanctioning rate control by groups of
carriers this legislation would represent a departure from the present transportation
policy of regulated competition.
2 U.S. CODE CONG. SErV. 2499 (1948).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 5b(2) (1970).
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Parties to any agreement approved by the Commission under
this section and other persons are, if the approval of such agreement is not prohibited by paragraph (4), (5), or (6) of this section,
relieved from the operation of the antitrust laws with respect to the
making of such agreement, and with respect to the carrying out of
such agreement in conformity with its provisions and in conformity
with the terms and conditions prescribed by the Commission.5
Approval of the agreement can be granted only if the Commission
finds that applying the antitrust relief in section 5a(9) to the agreement would further the "National Transportation Policy." 55 Approval is prohibited if an agreement establishing a procedure for
joint determination does not accord to each party "the free and
unrestrained right to take independent action either before or after
any determination arrived at through such procedure.""6
Enactment of section 5a in 1948 settled the issue to the satisfaction of the rail carriers concerning their recognized need to act
collectively on rate matters without incurring antitrust liability.
But the controversy was not over. Although the Supreme Court has
never decided a case involving railroad rate bureau immunity under
section 5a, two lower court decisions in the post-1948 period reveal
that there are certain limitations on the scope of the immunity
provided by the section. In Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway
v. Aircoach TransportationAssociation,57 four supplemental air carriers and their associations filed an antitrust suit against 40 railroads and two rate bureaus alleging that the defendants violated the
antitrust laws by utilizing certain bidding practices for United
States military traffic. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that the district court should exercise its
discretion and withhold its decision until the ICC had ruled on
whether the challenged practices were made pursuant to an approved agreement under section 5a.18 The court noted that the practices complained of constituted a system of price-fixing by competing, non-connecting carriers which would be illegal per se unless
54. 49 U.S.C. § 5b(9) (1970). Since the Revitalization Act amendments, this language is
found virtually verbatim in § 5b(8) of the Interstate Commerce Act. For a discussion of the
grant of immunity provided by the Act see Note, Immunity of Rate Association Agreements
from the Antitrust Laws: Requirements of the "Carriers'Rate Bureau Act of 1948," 18 OHIO
ST. L.J. 260 (1957).
55. 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970). The National Transportation Policy is set forth in the note
preceding 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
56. 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970).
57. 253 F.2d 877 (D.C. Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 930 (1960).
58. Id. at 886.
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made pursuant to an approved section 5a agreement.5 9 The court
pointed out, however, that ratemaking practices otherwise immune
from antitrust liability under section 5a would lose that protection
if they were used as "part of an effort by Railroads in combination
or conspiracy to eliminate the competition of Aircoach, rather than
used merely to meet that competition . . . .," The court did not
believe that the Interstate Commerce Act or any agreement made
under it could authorize the use of such practices for the purpose of
eliminating competition.
In a similar case, Riss & Co. v. Association of American
Railroads,' a motor vehicle common carrier sought treble damages
and injunctive relief from a number of railroads which had allegedly
conspired to eliminate the motor carrier as a competitor for explosives traffic. The railroads moved to suspend the proceedings and
to refer the case to the ICC for a ruling on whether the challenged
rate reductions were relieved from the operations of the antitrust
laws by section 5a(9) because they were covered by approved agreements. The district court denied the motion, stating that because
the plaintiffs had adequately alleged a violation outside the scope
of the immunity an ICC ruling would not be conclusive and would
only result in further delay.2 Following the rationale in Aircoach,
the court stated that if one of the purposes of the rate reduction was
to effectuate the elimination of the plaintiff as a competitor, then
no amount of coverage by approved agreements and no degree of
immunity under section 5a(9) of the Interstate Commerce Act could
remove the rate reductions from the prohibitions of the Sherman
3
Act.1
Thus, after a long period of ineffective reconciliation and resultant uncertainty, the enactment of section 5a in 1948 enabled rail
carriers to engage in the joint ratemaking necessitated by railroad
operations, the Interstate Commerce Act and the ICC without
threat of prosecution. 4 Analysis of the Riss and Aircoach cases make
it clear, however, that the exemption does not confer blanket immunity. It will not shield the carriers from antitrust liability when
the carriers engage in anticompetitive activity beyond the scope of
that immunity.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.

Id.
Id. at 887.
170 F. Supp. 354 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
Id. at 365.
Id.
See text accompanying notes 12 through 28 supra.
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RESTRICTING THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION-THE AMENDMENTS TO
SEcTION 5A

The relevant provisions of the 1976 amendments to section 5a
were incorporated by Congress into what is now section 5b(5) of the
Interstate Commerce Act. Basically, sections 5b(5)(a)(i) through
(iii) narrow the current antitrust immunity provided in section 5b
of the Act by barring: 1) agreement or voting on the single-line rates
of any individual carrier; 2) agreements or voting on rates relating
to a particular interline movement by carriers which can not practicably participate in such a movement; and 3) joint action to protest a rate established by independent action.6" Proponents of these
amendments argue that they were drafted for the express purpose
of eliminating anticompetitive practices in railroad ratemaking.6 s
Several problems arise, however, concerning the statutory language
utilized to achieve this desired goal.
Section 5b(5)(a)(i), the restriction barring joint agreement on single line rates, presents the first problem. It states in pertinent part:
In no event shall any conference, bureau, committee, or other
organization established or continued pursuant to any agreement
approved by the Commission under the provisions of this section(i) permit participation in agreements with respect to, or
any voting on, single-line rates, allowances, or charges established by any carrier[.]"
Under this section, the extent of anticompetitive conduct that will
be eliminated is somewhat less than what it might appear from a
literal reading of the language. As a means of preventing "coercive"
agreement on single line rates, the restriction is superfluous. Under
the carriers' right to take independent action, set forth in the same
paragraph," an individual railroad can establish or change its own
65. Pub. L. No. 94-210, § 208 (b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(5)(a)I
amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970). Under the legislative scheme of the amendments, the
Commission cannot approve a section 5b agreement which contains any procedures permitting the prohibited conduct. Any rate action by the carriers not in compliance with these
restrictions therefore, cannot be conduct performed pursuant to an approved agreement, and
thus falls outside the antitrust immunity provided by what is now § 5b(8).
66. See S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1976). The Report states in part:
[Wie are concerned that the scope of rate adjustments processed through rate
bureau procedures has had an inhibiting effect on rate innovation and that measures to encourage initiative in rate making and greater competition among carriers
of the same mode are necessary.
67. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 208(b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(5)(a)(1)],
amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970).
68. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 208 (b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(5)(a)],
amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970). Section 5b(5)(a) states in relevant part:
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single line rate at any time without going through a rate bureau.
This right of independent action is considered by the ICC as "paramount to maintaining the integrity of the grant of antitrust immunity." 9 There is evidence that the right is not illusory. Statistics
support the conclusion that an individual railroad will take independent action whenever it determines that it is in its own interest
and the interest of its shippers to do so.70
With respect to the prevention of "friendly," non-coercive agreements between carriers on single line rates, the restriction is qualified by the definition of "single line rate" provided in the Act:
As used in clause (i) of this subdivision, a single-line rate, allowance, or charge is one that is proposed by a single carrier applicable
only over its own line and as to which the service (exclusive of
terminal services provided by switching, drayage, or other terminal
carriers or agencies) can be performed by such carrier.7
Application of the restriction under this definition would not bar all
agreements on single line rates. The situation of two carriers participating in a joint line route while maintaining competing single line
routes provides an example. Agreement on a proposed change in the
joint rate might be conditioned on agreement to certain changes in
the competing single line rate to avoid a rate imbalance and possible
diversion of traffic. Such agreement as to the single line rate would
presumably constitute the anticompetitive conduct sought to be
prohibited. However, under the definition of "single line rate," the
rate must be one "proposed by a single carrier applicable only over
its own line."72 Therefore, in the example, if both carriers filed the
proposal to be applicable over both the single line and joint line
The Commission shall not approve under this section any agreement which establishes a procedure for the determination of any matter through joint consideration, unless it finds that under the agreement there is accorded to each party the
free and unrestrained right to take independent action, without fear of any sanction
or retaliatory action, at any time before or after any determination arrived at
through such procedure.
Therefore, any action by the carrier restraining this right of independent action cannot be
conduct performed pursuant to an approved agreement and thus falls outside the antitrust
immunity provided by section 5b(8).
69. Ex ParteNo. 297, Rate Bureau Investigation, 349 I.C.C. 811, 844 (1975).
70. Evidence submitted by the western railroads in Ex Parte No. 297 supports this position: 1407 notices of independent action were submitted to the rate bureaus in the western
district during 1973-an average of 5 each working day. Of these, 660 were submitted without
any proposal having previously been filed before a bureau. Statistics cited in Comments of
the Association of American Railroads, supra note 12, at 15.
71. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 208(b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(5)(a)],
amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970).
72. Id.
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routes, the proposed rate apparently would not come within the
definition of a single line rate, and thus, their action would not
constitute prohibited agreement on a single line rate.
When construed together, section 5b(5)(a)(i) and the definition of
single line rate implicitly recognize the concept discussed previously," that under certain circumstances, collective consideration
of single line and joint line rates is mandated by the integrated
nature of the system and the Interstate Commerce Act. While prohibiting collective interference with an individual carrier's determination of a single line rate for its own single line route, this restriction nevertheless provides for carrier freedom to collectively determine both single line and joint line rates when necessary. Since the
right of independent action under section 5b(5) already prevents
coerced agreement on single line rates, this restriction serves only
to reiterate and reinforce the importance of the right to the grant of
antitrust immunity.
Regarding the effect on antitrust immunity, the statutory language of the restriction places the bureaus and their members in a
state of uncertainty. No definition of "agreement" is provided.
Could permissible agreement by competitors on a joint rate at some
point become "agreement" on the competing single line rate? Even
more significantly, when does permissible collective "discussion" 7 4
on single line rates become an "agreement" with respect to that
single line rate? An apparently permissible discussion of the anticipated response of a single line carrier to a proposed change in a
competing joint line rate could conceivably be interpreted later as
an "agreement" with respect to the single line rate, if the joint rate
change and the "discussed" response of the single line carrier are
later implemented. Arguably, some meeting of the minds would
minimally be necessary to establish an "agreement." Although concerned with the determination of what constitutes an agreement for
purposes of establishing a Sherman Act violation, the following
cases disclose various factors tending to show "agreement." In
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States75 the Supreme Court held
that an inference of "agreement" could be drawn from the course
of conduct of the alleged conspirators.7" The Court found that
knowledge of the competing interests of-the parties, the motive for
73. See text accompanying notes 12 through 28 supra.
74. "Discussion" on single line rates was originally prohibited in the proposed amendment
but was later deleted.
75. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
76. Id. at 221.
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concerted action, the risk that without agreement diversity of action
would follow, and the substantial unanimity of action that resulted
were important factors to be considered in determining whether an
"agreement" had been reached.77 In United States v. Masonite
Corp.," the Court held that it was enough that the competitors,
knowing that concerted action was contemplated and invited, gave
their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.79 Proof of mere
behavior, however, does not conclusively establish
parallel business
"agreement." 0 This holding is reflected in a provision incorporated
by the 1976 amendments into what is now section 5b(5):
In any proceeding in which it is alleged that a carrier voted or
agreed upon a rate, allowance, or charge, in violation of the provisions of this section, the party alleging such violation shall have
the burden of showing that such vote or agreement occurred. A
showing of parallel behavior is not, by itself, sufficient to satisfy
such burden."'
At present the demarcation between permissible discussion and
prohibited agreement on single line rates under section 5b(6) is an
uncertain one. Without a definition of the key term "agreement,"
the extent of permissible discussion cannot accurately be determined beforehand. Bureaus that do not maintain strict control over
discussion of single line rates may be permitting the carriers to stray
beyond the presently amorphous borderline of antitrust immunity.
The second restriction, section 5b(5)(a)(ii), suffers from the same
definitional infirmity. That provision states:
In no event shall any conference, bureau, committee, or other
organization established or continued pursuant to any agreement
approved by the Commission under the provisions of this section(ii) permit any carrier to participate in agreements
with respect to, or to vote on, rates, allowances, or charges
relating to any particular interline movement, unless such
carrier can practicably participate in such movement .... 12
77. Id. at 222. See generally Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sherman Act,
75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).

78. 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
79. Id. at 275.
80. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. United States, 360 U.S. 395 (1959); Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954); Winchester Theatre Co. v.
Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 324 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1963).
81. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 208(b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(5)1,

amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970).
82. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 208(b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(5)(a)(ii)],
amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970). As with the previous restriction, the term "agreement"
is not defined and it remains unclear when permissible "discussion" may become prohibited
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Any carrier which participates in an agreement on a joint rate for
a joint movement in which that carrier cannot practicably participate would not be acting pursuant to its approved agreement. Such
actions would fall outside the antitrust immunity provided by section 5b(8). Thus, the Act requires an initial determination of which
carriers can "practicably participate" in the joint movement to
which the proposed rate will apply before any agreement on the rate
can be made. The Act itself does not define the key term "practicably participate," nor does it provide any standards concerning the
method of selecting eligible carriers. Nevertheless, application of
the restriction would seem to minimally require: 1) a determination
of existing routes and participants, if any, currently moving traffic
under present rates; 2) the formulation of a "circuity limitation"
that could be used to determine the point at which circuity would
be so great as to foreclose practicable participation; and 3) some
kind of a "mileage check" to determine which carriers meet the
circuity test. 3 Without any standard of practicable participation
only those carriers, if any, currently participating in the interline
route for which the rate is proposed and those railroads serving
exclusively either an origin or a destination named in the proposal
could be assured that they would have antitrust immunity to agree
on the joint rate.84
The third restriction, section 5b(5)(a)(iii),15 prevents a bureau
"agreement." See text accompanying notes 74 through 81. "Discussion" on such joint rates
by carriers which cannot practicably participate in the particular interline movement, permitted under the amendment as enacted, was originally prohibited in a prior proposed version
of the amendment. At the congressional hearings on the proposed amendments, a representative of the Department of Transportation indicated it was thought that the primary effect of
allowing such discussion to occur was anticompetitive. However, when asked if there was any
evidence of such anticompetitive effect, he replied:
Well, the evidence we have is largely intuitive, I would say. It is drawn from the
judgment of people who are consultants to us and employees of the Department who
have participated in rate bureau activities and analyzed their effects. We are relying on their judgment and our intuition of what happens when you sit down with
competitors and discuss the rates that you charge.
Comments of John Snow, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Department of Transportation,
Hearingson H.R. 12891, H.R. 5385, H.R. 13487, H.R. 10694 and S. 1149 Before the Subcomm.
on Transportationand Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong. 2d. Sess. 300 (1974).
83. Reply Verified Statement of J. R. Ahistrom, Before the Interstate Commerce Commission, at 28, Ex Parte No. 297 Rate Bureau Investigation, 349 I.C.C. 811 (1975).
84. Comments of the Association of American Railroads, supra note 12, at 11.
85. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 208(b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(5)(a)(iii)l,
amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b(6) (1970).
49 U.S.C. § 5b(5)(a)(iii) provides in pertinent part:
In no event shall any conference, bureau, committee or other organization . . .
(iii) permit, provide for, or establish any procedure for joint considera-
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from establishing any procedure permitting joint action to protest
a rate established by independent action. Compliance with this
restriction should not present, any practical difficulties, since rate
bureaus do not protest rates established by independent action."
Rather, this restriction seems to reflect an apparent confusion of
railroad rate bureau practices with those of other transportation
modes, particularly the motor carrier bureaus. 8 7 With respect to
railroad rate bureaus, this provision should have no discernible effect on the antitrust exposure of the bureaus and their members.
SHOULD RATE BUREAU ANTITRUST IMMUNITY BE ABOLISHED?

The enactment of the amendments to section 5a gives rise to
speculation regarding the possibility of further restrictions on, or
even ultimate repeal of, what is now the section 5b exemption.
Although the conference method of ratemaking has been sanctioned, 8 the necessity of the antitrust exemption has been a continuing source of controversy since the enactment of section 5a in
1948. The ICC has made its position clear:
We are convinced from the evidence of record that the Commission's administration of section 5a has contributed significantly to
the creation of an effective and dependable national transportation
system. The changes mandated herein, and the investigative approach utilized, are a more effective method of ensuring such a
system than the denial of antitrust immunity. Such denial would
be a giant step backwards in effective regulation of stable rate
structures and reduce this Nation's transportation system to a
state of uncertainty with respect to reasonable and lawful levels of
rates. We conclude that immunity from antitrust laws should be
89
continued.
Not everyone agrees that antitrust immunity is necessary to the
continued existence of the rate bureaus. Some commentators"
tion or any joint action to protest or otherwise seek the suspension of any rate
or classification filed by a carrier of the same mode pursuant to section 15(7)
of this part where such rate or classification is established by independent
action.
86. Statement of Stephen Ailes, supra note 11, at 429.
87. For example, motor carrier bureaus have protested rates established by independent
action of member carriers. See, Ex Parte No. 297, Rate Bureau Investigation 349 I.C.C. 811,
841-45 (1975). The ICC concluded that bureau protests interfere with the right of independent
action and therefore are prohibited.
88. See text accompanying notes 22 through 27 supra.
89. Ex Parte No. 297, Rate Bureau Investigation, 349 I.C.C. 811, 848 (1975).
90. E.g., Wiprud, CorrectiveAction Under the Antitrust Laws, 12 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
571 (1947) [hereinafter cited as Wiprud]; statement of David T. Sheehy, President of the
M/G Transport Service, Hearings on H.R. 12891, H.R. 5385, H.R. 13487, H.R. 10694 and S.
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have argued that bona fide negotiations between carriers, which are
intended to implement the requirements of the interstate Commerce Act, fall within the "legitimate area of collaboration" '2 alluded to by the Supreme Court in Georgia v. PennsylvaniaRailroad.
Under this rationale, full exposure of railroad ratemaking to the
antitrust laws would not result in the abolishment of rate bureaus
but, instead, would limit them to the proper areas of collaboration."
However, this analysis, which suggests a "rule of reason" analysis,"
runs contrary to the well settled antitrust approach to the joint
determination of prices by competitors:
Under the Sherman Act, a combination formed for the purpose
and with the effect of raising, depressing, fixing, pegging, or stabilizing the price of a commodity in interstate or foreign commerce
is illegal per se.95
Therefore, in the absence of a definitive Supreme Court ruling to the
contrary, it must be presumed that a per se standard would be
applied to railroad conference ratemaking. Under such a standard
the realities of the railroad ratemaking process-the integrated nature of the system and the requirements of the Interstate Commerce
Act-are not appropriate consideration. Therefore, the wisdom of
proposals to eliminate antitrust immunity under existing law can
seriously be questioned, since in the absence of antitrust immunity,
it appears doubtful that any realistic reconciliation of the broad
policies of the antitrust laws and the necessities of railroad ratemaking could be reached under a per se standard.
Fortunately, with the enactment of section 5b(10) as part of the
Revitalization Act amendments, such drastic action as total repeal
is wholly unnecessary. Paragraph 10 now provides:
The Federal Trade Commission, in consultation with the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, shall periodically prepare an assessment of, and shall report to the Commission on (a)
1149 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 505 (1974).
91. See, e.g., Wiprud, supra note 90, at 576.
92. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439, 460 (1945).
93. But see, Spychalski, On Transport Deregulation, ICC PRAC. J. 37, 39 (1971) which
contains an excellent analysis of some of the problems that might result following total
deregulation.
94. The rule of reason is a principle of construction which requires that interpretation of
the Sherman Act be made in the light of the broad public policy favoring competition and
condemning monopoly. The court must decide whether the challenged conduct is significantly and unreasonably anticompetitive in character or effect. See Standard Oil Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
95. United States v. Socony-Vaccuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223 (1940).
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any possible anticompetitive features of (i) any agreements approved or submitted for approval under this section, and (ii) any
conferences, bureaus, committees, or other organizations operating
under such agreements, and (b) possible ways to eliminate or alleviate any such anticompetitive features, effects, or aspects in a
manner that will further the goals of the national transportation
policy and this Act. The Commission shall make such reports
available to the public."1

This cooperative approach toward the elimination of anticompetitive conduct in a manner that will further the goals of the national
transportation policy presents the best opportunity for a final resolution of this long-running controversy. Under this provision, the
features of railroad ratemaking that require collaboration can be
given their due weight, and the elimination of identified anticompetitive practices can be accomplished gradually without precipitating the collapse of the entire railroad pricing structure.
CONCLUSION

The three restrictions incorporated by the Revitalization Act
amendments into section 5b(5)(a) were drafted for the purpose of
protecting the individual carrier's right to determine its rates according to its own assessment of market conditions free from the
possible coercion or interference of other carriers. To implement this
goal, the restrictions remove certain previously permitted joint actions from the antitrust immunity provided in section 5b. Collective
action taken in violation of these restrictions cannot be performed
pursuant to an approved agreement under section 5b and therefore
constitutes activity falling outside the parameters of antitrust immunity.
However, before the full extent of this contraction of antitrust
immunity can be determined, workable definitions of certain key
terms used in the restrictions must be formulated. Until the meaning of these terms is clarified, the demarcation between permissible
conduct and prohibited action under these restrictions cannot readily be determined beforehand.
Once these definitional infirmities have been corrected, continuation of the rate bureau ratemaking process seems assured. Instead
of implementing a total withdrawal of antitrust immunity, the
Revitalization Act amendments refine the immunity to eliminate
certain suspected anticompetitive features. Thus, Congress has
96. Pub. L. No. 94-210 § 208(b) (Feb. 5, 1976) [to be codified at 49 U.S.C. § 5c(10)],
amending 49 U.S.C. § 5b (1970).

19761

Railroad Antitrust Immunity

implicitly recognized the continued utility of the conference method
of ratemaking.9 7 These amendments may be construed as an effort
to confine carrier ratemaking powers to what proponents of the
amendments perceive as the "legitimate area of collaboration"
which was alluded to but never delineated by the Supreme Court
in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R.
Finally, the provisions of paragraph 10 of section 5b may hold the
key to the future viability of the rate bureau process. Paragraph 10
provides for communication and cooperation between the Federal
Trade Commission, the Justice Department and the Interstate
Commerce Commission which will foster identification and elimination of anticompetitive practices in a manner that will further the
goals of the "National Transportation Policy." This provision is a
sensible approach to a complex problem and deserves to be utilized
fully. Under this plan, a realistic and mutually acceptable reconciliation between the practices of the rate bureaus and the policies of
the antitrust laws may yet become a reality.
WILLIAM C. SIPPEL
97.

The Senate Report on the legislative history of the Revitalization Act notes:
A large measure of cooperation and collective action by and among common
carriers is necessary if the national transportation policy is to be effectuated and
the public is to receive the kind of transportation service to which it is entitled and
if the rates are to be reasonable and nondiscriminatory.
S. REP. No. 499, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 15 (1976).

